Recently controversy has surrounded the issue of whether Social
Using annual IMS data from 1990 to 1996, we examine empirically whether elderly-nonelderly price inflation differentials exist for prescription pharmaceuticals. We assess prices for prescription drugs destined for ultimate use by the elderly versus the nonelderly at three points in the distribution chain: initial sales from manufacturers, intermediate purchases by retail pharmacies, and final sales from retail pharmacies to patients or payors. We find that at the initial point in the distribution chain, no differences in price inflation exist for the aggregate of drugs destined for use by the elderly versus those for the nonelderly. At the intermediate sell-in point to pharmacy distribution, we examine antibiotics (ABs), antidepressants (ADs), and calcium channel blockers (CCBs). For ABs, since 1992 price inflation has been somewhat greater for the elderly than for the young, reflecting in part the elderly's more intensive use of newer branded products having fewer side effects, adverse drug interactions and more convenient dosing-attributes of particular importance to the elderly. For ADs, price inoation is considerably less for the elderly than for the young, due in large part to the elderly's greater use of older generic products. For CCBs, elderlynonelderly differentials are negligible. None of these differentials adjust for variations in quality.
At the final retail sell-out point, we examine only ADs. We find that because retailers obtain larger gross margins on generic than on branded products, and because the elderly are disproportionately large users of generic ADs, the elderly-nonelderly price inflation differential benefiting the elderly at the intermediate point is reduced considerably at final sale.
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I. Introduction
Over the next few decades, the U.S. population aged 65 and older will grow both in absolute numbers and as a share of the total population. As people age, they tend to have higher medical care expenses. Thus an increasingly elderly society can be expected to devote a greater amount of its expenditures to medical care. The implications of a graying society for future medical care expenditures depend of course on both the price and the quantity of future medical care for the elderly.
To the extent that they live on ªxed incomes, the elderly are particularly vulnerable to price inºation. Moreover, medical care price increases are likely to affect the elderly differentially, because medical care is a larger share of their current budgets. Recently there has been substantial controversy concerning the continued automatic adjustment of Social Security payments to the elderly on the basis of changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). A panel of experts estimates that the CPI overstates true cost-of-living increases by about 1.1% per year (U.S. Senate Finance Committee 1996).
Relatively little is known about the extent to which price inºation of the basket of medical care goods and services used by the elderly differs from the price inºation of the set of medical care goods and services used by younger Americans. In this chapter, we focus on elderly-nonelderly price inºation differentials for one component of medical care, namely, prescription pharmaceuticals, from 1990 to 1996. 1 The systems by which prescription pharmaceuticals are distributed and paid for in the United States are complex and rapidly changing.
1. For a discussion of patterns in total acute care health expenditures by patient age group from 1953 to 1987, see Cutler and Meara 1997. We assess elderly-nonelderly price differentials at three different points in the distribution chain: (1) the initial point involving sales from manufacturers to wholesalers, retailers, and hospitals; (2) an intermediate point at which retail pharmacies acquire prescription drugs from wholesalers and manufacturers; and (3) a ªnal point at which retail pharmacies dispense and sell prescription drugs to patients. With respect to payors, at the retail sell-out point in the distribution chain, we distinguish consumers' out-of-pocket expenditures for pharmaceuticals from those expenditures involving government funds (Medicaid and various public assistance programs) as well as from payments by private, third-party insurance sources (fee-for-service insurance plans and various forms of "medigap" and managed care).
One potential reason for elderly-nonelderly drug price inºation differentials is that the brand-generic proportions could vary by age. For treatment of acute conditions, the elderly may be more fragile, and thus prudent medical practice might suggest prescribing for them the newest generation of drugs having the fewest side effects and adverse drug interactions and the most convenient dosing. Under this hypothesis, for certain acute conditions, one might expect the elderly to use newer, branded drugs disproportionately. To the extent newer, branded drugs increase in price more rapidly than older, off-patent and generic drugs, the elderly's bundle of drugs would be expected to increase more rapidly than that of the young.
Although the same considerations would apply for treatment of chronic conditions, the surviving elderly are more likely to be using older drug products, for physicians are hesitant to change medications when a particular existing drug regimen is working well in treating a chronic condition. Because they have stickier usage patterns and have survived to old age, the elderly would therefore disproportionately use older drugs, which are more often available as generics, to treat their chronic conditions. Under this hypothesis, drug price inºation for the elderly's bundle would be less than that for the young. We examine both these hypotheses empirically, focusing on three therapeutic classes-antibiotics, antidepressants and calcium channel blockers.
We begin in the next section by providing background information on various trends and demographic aspects of the U.S. medical care marketplace and summarizing the literature dealing with age differentials in the rate of health care price inºation. In Sections III, IV, and V we focus on prices at initial, intermediate, and ªnal links of the distribution chain, respectively. We document and then examine implications of the fact that the elderly and nonelderly have differential uses of drugs across various therapeutic classes, and varying brandgeneric consumption patterns within therapeutic classes. We compute and report on separate elderly-nonelderly price indexes, using a ªxed-weight Laspeyres index that mimics procedures currently employed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and also employ a changing-share Divisia price index recommended for use by the CPI commission. We also comment on the important role of differential brand-generic gross margins at retail pharmacies. In section VI we summarize our ªndings, offer caveats, and outline important issues for future research.
II. Background

Health Care Expenditures
We begin by reviewing recent changes in the components, sources, location, and methods of payment for health care items with a particular focus on pharmaceuticals. In 1995, prescription drugs accounted for 6.3% of the $878.8 billion in total personal health expenditures, nonprescription drugs constituted 3.2%, professional medical services 34.1%, hospital care 39.8%, nursing home care 8.9%, home health care 3.3%, and supplies and other, the remaining 4.4%. The sources of funds for personal health expenditures varied considerably. Whereas consumers' out-of-pocket expenditures accounted for 18.3% of expenditures for physician services, 3.3% of those for hospital care, and 42.4% of those for nursing home care, direct consumer expenditures (including copayments and deductibles) constituted 39.5% of total prescription drug spending, down from 48.3% in 1990; private third-party insurance covered 39.8% of total prescription drug spending in 1994, up from 34. 5% in 1990. 3 The locus of prescription pharmaceutical sales is also undergoing change. In 1996, for example, about 57% of the money spent on pharmaceuticals involved retail sales (chain pharmacies, independents, mass merchandisers, and food stores), down from 64% in 1990.
Whereas the dollar share for mail order increased from 5% to 9%, that for hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes remained relatively constant, 28% in 1990 and 29% in 1996, as did that for staff model health maintenance organizations (HMOs)-2% in both years. 4 Within the retail sector, method of payment has changed dramatically over the last several years. As table 2.1 shows, since 1991 the share of new prescriptions paid for by cash has fallen sharply from 59% to 32%, whereas that paid for directly by third-party sources other than Medicaid has doubled, increasing from 28% to 57%. Third-party insurance has now become the predominant method of payment for prescription pharmaceuticals sold in retail outlets. The Medicaid share of dollars has varied less, from a high of about 15% in 1993 to about 11% in 1996. (Note that Medicare does not cover outpatient pharmaceutical expenses.) In terms of numbers of new prescriptions, the 1990-96 average annual growth rate (AAGR) for cash customers is −6.6% vs. 20.5% for third-party payors.
The above discussion on health expenditures does not distinguish by age group. Through its annual Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), the BLS collects data on consumers' out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPs) for various budget items, including components of health care. The CES's unit of observation is the consumer unit ("household"), deªned as "the person/group of persons in the household who is/are independent of all other persons in the household for payment of their major expenses" (U.S. Department of Commerce 1994, 3). The person in the consumer unit (CU) with major ªnancial responsibility for payment of housing expenses is called the reference person ("head of household") of the consumer unit. CUs are stratiªed in a number of ways, including one of particular interest to us, namely, by age of the reference person. In tables 2.2 and 2.3 we summarize data from the 1990 and 1995 CES. Five points are particularly worth noting.
First, as one would expect, older Americans tend to have larger OOPs on medical care items and services than do the younger. The OOPs per CU health expenditure share generally grows with age, but it increases particularly sharply after age 65, as the top three panels of Interestingly, the proportion of consumer units aged 65-74 decreased very slightly between 1990 and 1995, from 11.7% to 11.6%, but the percentage of consumer units aged 75 and over increased more sharply, from 9.0% to 9.6%, resulting in an increase in their OOP health expenditures share over all age groups from 13.5% to 14.8%.
Third, although total OOPs health care expenditure patterns may be stable, since 1990 people of all ages (and especially the elderly) appear to have signiªcantly substituted payments to health insurance for direct payments for professional medical services, drugs, and medical supplies.
7 Note that in the CES, consumer OOP expenditures for health insurance are the sum of employees' pretax contributions at work and direct health insurance premium payments, but employers' health insurance contributions are not included, for those are treated as a business expense. As the second panel of table 2.3 shows, for all consumers the health insurance share increased from 39% to 50% between 1990 and 1995. For those under age 65, the 1995 health insurance share was about 45%, up from slightly under 40% in 1990; for the elderly, however, the increase was even greater, from 45% in 1990 to 58% in 1995. Thus by 1995 more than half of the elderly's OOPs health care budget was devoted to health insurance.
5. For comparisons back to 1980, see Acs and Sabelhaus 1995. 6 . Note that these OOPs exclude all government funding, such as that for Medicare. Thus the 32% ªgure likely understates the elderly's proportion of total OOPs plus government health care expenditures. 7. Employers may also be shifting health insurance premium costs and copayments/ deductibles to their employees. For discussion, see Baker and Kramer 1991 and Cowan et al. 1996. Is Price Inºation Different for the Elderly? 39
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Fourth, in a related development, the professional medical services component of OOP expenditures has fallen sharply since 1990, as insurers presumably have borne a greater share. In 1990, for example, the average expenditure on medical services by those aged 65 and over was $664, but by 1995 this had fallen 28% to $479. For all consumers, the medical service expenditure share fell from 38% to 30%, but for those 65 and over the drop was even larger, from 30% in 1990 to 18% in 1995.
Fifth, for drugs (the CES data include both prescription and overthe-counter nonprescription drug expenditures), in both 1990 and 1995 expenditures increased with age and were about twice as large for the elderly relative to all consumers. The level of OOP expenditures increased about 11% for all consumers from 1990 to 1995 ($252 to $280), but for the elderly, the OOPs increase was larger, about 14-15% ($475 to $544). In terms of expenditure shares, the drug component fell slightly, from 17% to 16% for all consumers, presumably reºecting a shift to payments by health insurers. For those 75 and over, the drop in the drug component of OOPs was slightly larger, from 22.5% in 1990 to 20.7% in 1995.
In summary, the CES data indicate that the composition of OOPs has changed considerably since 1990, and in different ways for the elderly versus the nonelderly. A dominant trend for people of all ages, however, is away from direct out-of-pocket payments for medical services, drugs, and medical supplies and instead toward health insurance. To the extent that this growth in health insurance results in greater buying power by agents of consumers relative to that of providers and suppliers, and to the extent any resulting lower provider-supplier prices are passed on to consumers in the form of lower health insurance premiums, this shift could result in beneªts to consumers, particularly the elderly.
Medical Prices: Entire U.S. Population
Expenditures are by deªnition the product of price times quantity. Disaggregating the growth of health expenditures into price and quantity components involves many conceptual and practical difªculties. and related services. Each of these price indexes is based on consumers' OOPs and thereby excludes all payments by governments and thirdparty insurers.
9
Recent MCPI data show that prices consumers pay for medical care have been increasing more rapidly than those for other items. Indexed to 100 in 1990, the 1996 MCPI was 140.2, for prescription drugs it was 133.7, for nonprescription drugs and medical supplies 118.7, for physicians' services 134.6, and for hospital and related services 151.4, whereas the CPI for all items was only 120.0.
10 Thus, except for nonprescription drugs, prices of health-related items and services generally appear to have risen more rapidly than the overall CPI. Moreover, as table 2.4 shows, this more rapid increase of the MCPI relative to the CPI is not a recent phenomenon. Since 1927, the ªrst year for which MCPI data are available, medical inºation has generally been greater than that of all goods and services.
11 Over the entire 1927-96 time period, the MCPI has risen at an AAGR of 4.59%, more than 40% above the 3.24% for the overall CPI.
In its recent report to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee (1996), however, the CPI commission concluded that the MCPI was substantially upward biased, stating that ". . . healthcare inºation is seriously 9. However, in constructing the BLS's MCPI, the out-of-pocket payments for health insurance are in turn distributed into payments by insurers for medical services, medical commodities, and health insurers' retained earnings. See Fixler 1996 , Daugherty 1964 , Ford and Sturm 1988 , and Getzen 1992 . United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996, CPI Detailed Report, Tables 1 and 3 (CPI for All Urban Consumers). 11. For several years in 1927-46, however, year-to-year changes in the CPI were greater than for the MCPI. See Getzen 1992 for a discussion.
overstated because of the substantial uncounted quality change" (72, footnote 71), such as improvements in outcomes (60; see also Shapiro and Wilcox 1996) . Speciªcally, the commission estimated that the upward bias of the MCPI is 3% per year for prescription drugs, for professional medical services, and for hospital and related services, and 1% for nonprescription drugs (58-62). Moreover, the commission recommended major changes in the BLS's treatment of health insurance expenditures (iv). Currently the BLS's procedures for the health insurance component do not take changing coverages into account, but instead simply multiply a medical care price index by an index of health insurance ex post retained earnings, that is, the ratio determined by health insurance revenues minus health insurance payments, all divided by health insurance revenues (Lane 1996, 22 ; see also references in note 9). The BLS also publishes producer price indexes (PPIs) for various industries, focusing on the initial point in the distribution chain, where it "measures average changes in selling prices received by domestic producers for their output" (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1992, 140). Although the BLS has published PPIs for certain health-related industries such as prescription pharmaceuticals for many years, currently there is no overall medical care PPI. Recently, however, the BLS introduced separate PPIs for ofªces and clinics of doctors of medicine (December 1993), skilled and intermediate care facilities (December 1994) , general medical and surgical hospitals (December 1992), psychiatric hospitals (December 1992), and medical laboratories (June 1994) . A number of recent research studies report that for pharmaceuticals, the PPI overstates price inºation considerably.
12
Studies by Cutler et al. (1996) on the treatment of heart attacks and by Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) on cataract surgery also suggest substantial upward bias in medical-related PPIs. Cutler et al. point out that apparent price inºation actually involves frequent substitution of more expensive but also more effective inputs.
Medical Prices: Focus on the Elderly
Larger medical-related expenditure weights for the elderly than for the young combined with apparent greater price inºation for medical care items than for the overall CPI has created an impression that the 12. See, for example, Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett 1993 , Griliches and Cockburn 1994 , and Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches 1996 relatively large price increases involving health care items and services in the last decade have adversely affected the elderly in particular. Indeed, such considerations played a prominent role in the recent debate concerning a possible downward adjustment of the CPI to index Social Security beneªts for the elderly. 13 As noted earlier, however, the greater growth of the MCPI than for the CPI goes back at least to 1927. Hence, for the many years when today's elderly were younger, they too beneªted from inºation that was less burdensome for them than for the elderly of their time. Over the entire life cycle, it is not at all clear whether today's elderly cohort is relatively better or worse off than earlier or future elderly cohorts. With this caveat in mind, along with the understanding that growth in the MCPI may be overstated because of overlooked quality improvements, we now brieºy summarize the existing literature on separate price indexes for the elderly.
14 Anticipating that the introduction of Medicare in July 1966 might have an impact on medical care prices in summer 1965 the Social Security Administration arranged with the BLS to collect supplementary prices for three surgical procedures-cholecystectomy (removal of gall bladder), prostatectomy (removal of prostate gland), and fractured neck of femur (hip surgery)-and two in-hospital medical servicesacute myocardial infarction (treatment of heart attack) and cerebral hemorrhage (stroke)-that were particularly important to older persons, though not necessarily limited to them. A report to the President, summarized by Rice and Horowitz (1967, based on U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1967), concluded that " [t] he index of the ªve in-hospital surgical and medical procedures particularly signiªcant for the aged did not increase as rapidly during 1966 as the combined index for physicians' fees regularly priced for the CPI" (28).
15
More recently, in response to a mandate from 1987 amendments to the Older Americans Act of 1965, the BLS created an experimental price index for elderly consumers (CPI-E). The CPI-E employs differential expenditure weights for the elderly (deªned as ages 62 and over) 13 . See, for example, Kuttner 1997 and Gephardt 1997. 14. For a review of literature on various BLS experimental price indexes, including a separate price index for the poor, both old and young, see Garner et al. 1996 and Moulton-Stewart 1997. 15 . Rice and Horowitz (1967, 25) report that the December 1965-December 1966 price index growth rates ranged from 2.5% for cholecystectomy to 6.9% for prostatectomy, whereas the combined index for physicians' fees regularly priced for the CPI increased 7.8%.
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and nonelderly, based on CES data, but assumes that within each category weight, the distribution of prices, the outlets from which consumers buy, the use of coupons and availability of discounts, as well as the quality of the items purchased, are the same for the elderly and the nonelderly. 16 From 1982 through 1996, the CPI-E for the elderly rose 67.9%, while the CPI rose 62.5%, implying that over the entire fourteen-year time span, the CPI had an AAGR of 3.53%, while the CPI-E for the elderly grew at a slightly larger 3.77% per year. 17 The larger health care expenditure weights for the elderly, along with greater measured medical price inºation, account almost entirely for the difference in AAGRs. As noted by the CPI commission, however, medical care prices are likely to have overstated inºation by not fully accounting for improvements in quality. If this is correct, then as Moulton and Stewart (1997) note, "A reduced rate of inºation for medical care would mitigate and perhaps eliminate any difference between the CPI-E and the ofªcial CPIs" (21).
A related recent study by Garner, Johnson, and Kokoski (1996) focuses on experimental price indexes for the poor, based on several alternative deªnitions of "poor." Using CES data for weights, along with CPI prices from 1984 to 1994, they ªnd "very little difference between the experimental consumer price indexes produced for the poor and the corresponding CPI for the whole sample" (33). Similarly, Rubin and Koelin (1996) , examining real income growth and expenditures on necessities for a variety of demographic groups from 1980 to 1990, conclude that . . . for the population in general, well-being increased over the 1980s, as measured by both real income and discretionary spending. The well-being of elderly households increased relatively more than that of nonelderly households, and the well-being of recipients of cash assistance increased relatively less than that of those who did not receive assistance.
18 (P. 30) In summarizing their ªndings concerning differential rates of price growth experienced by diverse groups in the population, the CPI commission stated:
Some have suggested that different groups in the population are likely to have faster or slower growth in their cost of living than recorded by changes in the 16. See Garner, Johnson, and Kokoski 1996, 37, and Stewart 1997, 18 . The time costs of shopping could also differ for the elderly. 17. See Amble and Mason 1988 With this information and brief overview of related literature as background, we now turn to a discussion of our own new research. In section III we focus on drug prices at the ªrst point in the distribution chain, from producers to wholesalers, hospitals, and retailers. 19 In section IV we examine an intermediate point, namely, the acquisition prices retail pharmacies pay to wholesalers and manufacturers. Then in section V we assess prices at ªnal points in the distribution chain, from retail pharmacies to patients and payors. Because of data limitations, we do not examine prices received by mail order pharmacies, which account for roughly 9% of total prescription dollar sales.
III. Producers' Prices for Drugs Destined for Use by Old versus Young
In reporting on prices at the ªrst point in the distribution chain from manufacturers to wholesalers and retailers, the BLS publishes monthly PPIs for about ªfty therapeutic classes of prescription pharmaceuticals, such as analgesics, broad-and medium-spectrum antibiotics, cancer therapy products, cardiovascular therapy products, antidepressants, and vitamins. Prices in these various therapeutic classes have increased at different rates. Since 1981, PPIs for anticoagulants, antiarthritics, and systemic anti-infectives, for example, have increased at much lower rates than have those for sedatives, central nervous system (CNS) stimulants/antiobesity preparations and psychotherapeutics. 20 Because the elderly are likely to have conditions, diseases, and illnesses that differ from those of the nonelderly, there is no a priori reason to expect that the price inºation for the basket of drugs used by the elderly has occurred at the same rate as that for the drug combinations used by the nonelderly.
IMS America, a ªrm specializing in sales and marketing data for medical and pharmaceutical products, regularly samples the prescrib- 19. In 1995 19. In (1990 , 78.9% (71.8%) of manufacturers' sales were to wholesalers, 12.1% (15.8%) were to retailers, and 4.8% (9.3%) were to hospitals (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 1997, ªg. 4-12, p. 30) . 20. Indexed to June 1981 = 100, the PPI index values in June 1996 were 145.9, 192.6, and 221.5 for anticoagulants, antiarthritics, and systemic anti-infectives, respectively and 730.9, 605.8, and 500.5 for sedatives, CNS stimulants/antiobesity preparations, and psychotherapeutics, respectively. (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996, table 5, p. 61).
Is Price Inºation Different for the Elderly? 47 NDTI data therefore permit us to compare the drugs prescribed for use by the elderly with those prescribed for younger patients, including differences involving brands versus generics. Based on annual NDTI data for 1996 we list, in the top panel of table 2.5, the twenty top-selling therapeutic classes of drugs for the elderly; in the bottom panel, we list the corresponding leading classes for the nonelderly. Prescriptions written for the elderly constitute 18.7% of all new prescriptions, whereas those for the nonelderly account for the remaining and much larger 81.3%. For both the young and the old, the leading therapeutic class is broad-and medium-spectrum antibiotics; drugs in this class comprise almost 15.8% of new prescriptions written for those under age 65, but only 7.4% for the elderly. The most frequent new prescriptions for the young include antidepressants, sex hormones, cough/cold preparations and oral contraceptives; those for the elderly include various cardiovasculars (antihypertensives, adrenergic blockers, calcium channel blockers, diuretics), as well as glaucoma and cancer therapies. The table does not consider differences between young and old in the relative use of drugs by therapeutic class; ªg-ure 2.1 highlights the most substantial of these differences. As the ªgure shows, the ªve therapeutic classes with the largest differences in elderly-nonelderly usage are antibiotics, vaccines, antidepressants, cough and cold preparations, and oral contraceptives, all of which are more intensively used by the young.
We now turn to price data. The BLS makes publicly available the ªxed-quantity weights it employs in aggregating the various therapeutic class-speciªc price indexes into an overall prescription pharmaceutical PPI. The third column of table 2.6 lists these quantity weights from the BLS's 1993 Cycle C sample; the next column lists the percentage of all new prescriptions in that therapeutic class that are written for the elderly. The ªnal six columns list the BLS's PPI by therapeutic class annually from 1991 to 1996, normalized to 100.0 in 1990.
As shown in table 2.6, the elderly are particularly important consumers in a number of therapeutic classes-anticonvulsants (51%), cancer therapy products (39%), cardiovascular therapy products (42%), diabetes therapy (38%), diuretics (45%), and nutrients and supplements (53%)-although only for the cancer and cardiovascular therapy products are the PPI weights substantial. Therapeutic classes in which the elderly account for a relatively low fraction of consumption include systemic anti-infectives (10%), cough and cold preparations (7%), dermatological preparations (7%), muscle relaxants (8%), and vitamins (3%). Therapeutic classes with the largest price increases since 1990 include cough and cold preparations (57%), bronchial therapy (54%), anticonvulsants (48%), systemic antihistamines (45%), and psychotherapeutics (45%), and in all cases except anticonvulsants, these are therapeutic classes with disproportionately large to average use by the young, rather than by the elderly. Those therapeutic classes having the smallest price increases since 1990 include muscle relaxants (16%), ophthalmic and otic preparations (19%), miscellaneous prescription pharmaceuticals (21%), antiarthritics (22%), and vitamins (23%); these show a more mixed pattern of relative usage by old and young.
To aggregate these various therapeutic class PPIs into overall price indexes separately for the elderly and the nonelderly, we ªrst assume, for the moment, that within each of the therapeutic classes old and young face the same prices (an assumption we relax in section IV) and multiply these BLS therapeutic class quantity weights by the relative old versus young proportions of 1996 new prescriptions, based on NDTI data. We then multiply these therapeutic class-speciªc elderly and nonelderly quantity weights times the BLS's published PPI for that class, normalized to unity in 1990.
22 Finally, we aggregate over the various therapeutic classes and thereby obtain separate prescription pharmaceutical PPIs for drugs destined for use by the elderly and the nonelderly. Table 2 .7 summarizes results from this calculation over 1990-96.
The very striking conclusion that emerges from inspection of table 2.7 is that in aggregate, manufacturers' prices for pharmaceutical products destined for use by the elderly change at virtually the same rate as those destined for use by the nonelderly. By 1996, the PPI over all consumers was 1.330, that for the elderly was 1.331, and that for the nonelderly was 1.329. Hence, despite substantial differences in usage among the elderly and nonelderly of drugs from various therapeutic classes, and even though manufacturers' price changes since 1990 have varied considerably among the therapeutic classes, in the aggregate, at the initial point in the distribution chain from drug manufacturers, there appears to be no price inºation differential by age group, at least according to the ofªcial BLS price statistics.
IV. Retail Sell-In Prices: Elderly versus Nonelderly
The PPI calculations presented in the previous section assume that within each therapeutic class, prices for products destined for use by the elderly have the same distribution as those for the nonelderly. We now relax that assumption.
22. Notice that we are implicitly assuming here that the old-young distribution within each therapeutic class is the same for sales from manufacturers to wholesalers, to hospitals, and to retailers. We relax this assumption in section IV. Based on its electronic computer record survey of about 34,000 retail pharmacies (independents, chains, mass merchandisers, and food stores), IMS gathers data on brand and generic sales for each chemical compound as well as on pharmacy acquisition prices and pharmacy selling prices for the highest selling form/strength/package of each product. In addition, IMS collects separate retail prices for the topselling presentation of each product by method of payment-cash, Medicaid, and private third party. IMS reports these data in its Retail Perspective and its Retail Methods of Payment.
23
Within each of these three therapeutic classes, data are therefore available on what drugs were prescribed, whether brand or generic, the leading selling form/strength/package of each product, whether destined for use by the elderly or the nonelderly, sell-in price to pharmacy, and sell-out prices to consumers and payors. Here we focus on that point in the distribution chain involving acquisition prices paid by retail pharmacies (what IMS calls sell-in prices), whereas in section V we focus on retail pharmacy sell-out prices to various consumers and payors. We now concentrate on three leading therapeutic classes: broad-and medium-spectrum antibiotics, calcium channel blockers, and antidepressants.
A priori, two possible hypotheses come to mind concerning differential elderly-nonelderly drug usage within these therapeutic classes. The ªrst concerns medications used to treat acute conditions. It is plausible to assume that the health of seniors is more fragile than that of the nonelderly and that as a result, prudent medical practice would advise prescribing for the elderly those products that, given similar efªcacy, had the fewest adverse interactions with other drugs and the fewest side effects. 24 Newly introduced drugs are frequently about as efªcacious as older products but have superior adverse-interaction and side-effect proªles. More convenient dosing of newer products, such as once-a-day "sustained release" versions, also facilitates patient compliance, particularly for the elderly, who are more likely to have memory lapses. These newer products typically command a price premium and experience greater price inºation than older, off-patent generic drugs. 25 To the extent these assumptions are valid, therefore, we would hypothesize that for medications used to treat acute condi-23. For further details, see IMS America 1996, chaps. 20 and 41. 24. One might also argue that the very young are more vulnerable as well. 25. This is clearly the case for antidepressants, such as the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which have similar efªcacy but superior adverse-interaction and side-effect tions, prices faced by the elderly would tend to grow more rapidly than those for the young.
26
A second hypothesis concerns medications used to treat chronic conditions. Here the same basic factors are at work as noted above for acute conditions. In addition, however, for chronic conditions, the old might be expected to have chosen to use older drug products, for physicians are hesitant to change medications when a particular existing drug regimen is working well. 27 With stickier consumption patterns and by surviving to old age, the elderly would therefore disproportionally use older drugs, which are more often available as generics. If this hypothesis is true, drug prices within certain chronic areas might grow less rapidly for the elderly versus the nonelderly, because generic prices have fallen in the last decade while prices of brands typically increased. (See, for example, Cockburn 1994 and Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches 1996.) However, patent protection has expired for only the very old drugs. For older drugs still patent protected, price increases tend to be larger than for younger drugs. (See, for example, Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett 1993; Kanoza 1996; and Ristow 1996 .) Thus, any price inºation differential between old and young consumers of both acute and chronic medications depends on the distribution of sales between older drugs with and without patent protection. Because such a distribution is an empirical matter that could vary by therapeutic class and change over time, our hypotheses make no deªnitive prediction for any elderly-nonelderly price inºation differential but must be examined in the context of the distribution of sales between brands and generics in each therapeutic class.
Among the three therapeutic classes we examine here, we expect that the cardiovascular products, such as calcium channel blockers, are used predominantly for treatment of chronic conditions, whereas the broad-and medium-spectrum antibiotics are used primarily to treat acute conditions. In terms of protracted use, antidepressants are most likely to fall between the antibiotics and the cardiovasculars, because they are used to treat both episodic and more chronic forms of depression. In all three therapeutic classes, however, the elderly and proªles relative to the older tricyclic antidepressants. See Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches 1996 for further discussion. 26. For a discussion of pricing considerations involving drugs to treat acute versus chronic conditions, see Lu and Comanor 1996. 27 . This is consistent with the common medical adage, "Don't shoot a singing bird." nonelderly may use drugs for a different set of conditions. In the case of antidepressants, for example, physicians frequently prescribe tricyclic antidepressants for "off-label" conditions, such as chronic pain syndromes, that the elderly experience more frequently.
With this as background, we begin by examining retail pharmacy acquisition (sell-in) costs and price indexes for the broad-and mediumspectrum antibiotic (AB) class of drugs. As the top panel of table 2.8 shows, retail acquisitions of ABs almost doubled from 1990 to 1996, growing from $2.1 to $3.8 billion. Roughly 90% of the retail pharmacy acquisition costs are for ABs destined for use by the young. The overall brand/generic shares for ABs are somewhat volatile, ranging from 81%/19% in 1990 to 90%/10% in 1993. Over the entire time period, brand share for the elderly has grown from 82% to 91% (generic share has fallen from 18% to 9%), whereas for the young, the brand share has increased only from 81% to 87%. The AB brand share hit its peak in 1992-94 at about 89-90% (for all), then fell to about 88% (all), 87% (young) and 91% (elderly) in 1996. Thus, particularly since 1992-94, the elderly's use of branded antibiotic products has grown considerably more rapidly and to greater proportions than that of the young. This is, of course, consistent with the acute-care hypothesis discussed above. It is also consistent with the notion that the elderly are increasingly using newer, branded products having higher efªcacy in treating severe or life-threatening infections such as pneumonia, in part because of increasing bacterial resistance to older drugs. 28 We now turn to price indexes, which can be constructed in a number of ways. The BLS employs a ªxed-weight procedure known as the Laspeyres price index that keeps weights of the various items in the index ªxed over time. The CPI commission has criticized this ªxed-weight procedure and has recommended instead a chain-weighted index with changing weights that reºect evolving market shares of items over time. (See U.S. Finance Committee 1996.) The most common version of such a chained index is the (Tornqvist discrete approximation to the) Divisia index. 29 We therefore construct price indexes mim- icking the BLS ªxed-weight procedure, using 1990 ªxed-quantity weights, but also report price indexes with the more preferred Divisia index calculation that allows for changing market shares.
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In rows labeled "Laspeyres" in the top panel of table 2.8, we present 1990-96 retail acquisition price indexes for ABs over all consumers (Laspeyres index-All), for ABs destined for use by the young (Young) and for ABs destined for use by the old (Elderly). 31 We ªrst obtain the somewhat surprising result that with the Laspeyres index, over the entire 1990-96 time period, ABs used by the elderly increased in price about 12%, whereas for the nonelderly the price increase was somewhat larger, at 17%. However, if one looks only from 1992 onward, the reverse occurred-the elderly AB price index increased 11%, from 1.009 to 1.121, whereas that for the nonelderly increased 7%, from 1.096 to 1.173.
These ªndings for ABs are essentially unaffected when one employs changing share weights and the preferable Divisia index. 32 As seen in the bottom three rows of the top panel of table 2.8 and graphically in ªgure 2.2, using the Divisia, by 1996 the price index for ABs destined for use by the elderly was 1.07, slightly less than the 1.11 for the young. After 1992, however, the AB price index increased only very slightly for the young (2% from 1.08 in 1992 to 1.11 in 1996) , whereas for the elderly it increased considerably more (7%, from 1.00 to 1.07). In part, this old-young differential reºects a greater increase in use of newer branded drugs by the old than by the young since 1992, as noted above. To show this in greater detail, in ªgure 2.3 we present 1996 elderly utilization for each AB molecule and distinguish brands (light bars) from multisource (dark bars) drugs. The dotted vertical line in ªgure 2.3 represents the elderly average percentage over all ABs (9.8%). The elderly's differential use of brands and generics can be seen by noting that for the vast majority of drugs involving relatively 30. This ªxed-weight procedure is not the same as that employed by the BLS in its CPI for prescription drugs for a number of reasons, including the fact that the CPI uses only OOPs' weights, whereas weights here include retail acquisition costs for products destined for payment by cash, third party and Medicaid. Moreover, the index here refers to retail acquisition costs, not retail sales to patients and payors. Cleeton, Goepfrich, and Weisbrod (1992) and Armknecht, Moulton, and Stewart (1994) describe the BLS's CPI method for prescription drugs. 31. The elderly-nonelderly split for each drug is based on the average of the 1992, 1994, and 1996 NDTI values. 32. For the Laspeyres, the number of AB items is ªxed at 156, whereas for the Divisia, the numbers are 162, 172, 188, 188, 190, 192, and 196, respectively, from 1990 to 1996. Is Price Inºation Different for the Elderly? 57
intense use by the elderly, the molecule in question is a branded, single-source (light bar) drug. We now turn to retail sell-in prices for antidepressants (ADs). As the top row of the middle panel of table 2.8 shows, retail-sector purchases of ADs surged by a factor of about four between 1990 and 1996, thereby growing considerably more rapidly than those of ABs, although by 1996 total retail acquisition expenditures for the two were about equal, at $3.73 billion for ADs versus $3.77 billion for ABs. ADs were also similar to ABs in that the retail acquisition dollar share for products destined for use by the young for both classes was about 90%, with a very slight upward trend over the period. A distinctive feature of the AD market involves the tremendous growth in sales of the newest generation of ADs, the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) such as Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, and Serzone. This high growth of new branded products has resulted in a sharply declining generic dollar share of retail-sector purchases (from 12% in 1990 to 3% in 1996) and a corresponding increase in the dollar share for brands (88% to 97%). In each year between 1990 and 1996, the share of retail drugstore purchases of generic ADs for use by the elderly was larger than that for the young; the 1990 generic shares for old and young were 15% and 12%, respectively, and by 1996 they had fallen to 5% and 3%, respec- tively. This differential brand-generic pattern could reºect the phenomenon noted above that certain generic tricyclic antidepressants are often prescribed "off-label" to treat chronic pain syndromes that occur more frequently in the elderly. With respect to price indexes, we ªrst report results based on the ªxed-weight Laspeyres procedure. As shown in the middle panel of table 2.8, the AD price inºation differential between old and young appears to be negligible-by 1996, the Laspeyres index for the elderly was 1.30, very slightly less than that for the young at 1.32.
For the more appropriate Divisia index, which takes changing shares into account, however, the inºation differential is considerably larger, with the 1996 index being 1.20 for the elderly but 1.28 for the young.
33
In ªgure 2.4 we plot these Divisia AD price indexes for the entire population, for the elderly, and for the young. As the ªgure shows, price inºation for retail acquisitions of ADs destined for use by the elderly has been appreciably less than that for ADs destined for use by the young.
To understand the reason underlying this inºation differential, in ªgure 2.5 we plot the elderly share for each AD chemical molecule; the patent-protected drugs are again marked with light bars, and generic 33. The number of items in the 1990 ªxed weight Laspeyres index is 46, whereas for the Divisia it is 50 in 1990-1, 54 in 1992-3, 58 in 1994-5, and 60 in 1996. or multisource drugs are marked with dark bars; over all AD molecules, the elderly average share is 10.3%, represented by the dotted vertical line. As the ªgure shows, the elderly's use of off-patent and generic drugs such as trimipramine, protriptyline, nortriptyline, maprotiline, imipramine, doxepin, amoxapine, and amitriptyline is above that of the general population. Elderly use of some newer and still patent-protected branded drugs such as venlafaxine (brand name Effexor), sertraline (Zoloft), paroxetine (Paxil), and nefazodone (Serzone) is about the same as that of the general population, but elderly use of other patent-protected ADs such as ºuvoxamine (Luvox), ºuoxetine (Prozac), and buproprion (Wellbutrin) is less than that by the general population. Given these differential brand-generic uses by the elderly versus the young, and with generic prices falling while brand prices are increasing, the basket of ADs destined for use by the elderly is increasing more slowly in price than the basket of ADs destined for use by the young. Because it employs changing share rather than ªxed weights, the Divisia index better captures these dynamics. Note that the inºation differential would be even larger if the dollar share of generics had not been falling. Next we turn to the calcium channel blockers (CCBs), drugs used to treat cardiovascular conditions, which have brand names such as Cardizem, Norvasc, and Procardia XL. As with the ABs, acquisition costs of CCBs among retailers approximately doubled from 1990 to 1996, with total acquisition costs of around $3.2 billion in 1996, about 15% less than for ABs. The elderly share of CCBs, however, is much larger than that for ABs and ADs. As the bottom panel of table 2.8 shows, the retail acquisition dollar share of CCBs for the elderly is more than 40%, having fallen slightly from 45% in 1990 to 42% in 1996. The brandgeneric market share pattern is also different, and is not monotonic over time, reºecting in part episodic patent expirations and generic entry within the 1990-96 time frame. For the elderly, the generic share increased from 1% in 1990 to 8% in 1994, then fell to about 4% in 1996; for the young, the respective generic shares are similar, at 2%, 8%, and 4% for those same years, respectively.
In terms of price indexes, because of the relatively small brandgeneric differences by age group, there is only a negligible difference between CCB retail-acquisition price inºation for products destined for use by the elderly versus those for the young. Speciªcally, as shown in the bottom panel of table 2.8 and graphically in ªgure 2.6, the oldyoung Laspeyres indexes are 1.27 versus 1.26, whereas for the Divisia they are 1.11 versus 1.10. In large part, this similarity in elderlynonelderly price inºation for CCBs reºects the fact that brand-generic differences between the old and young are much smaller in any given year for the CCBs than they are for the ADs and ABs. Figure 2 .7 displays this more modest relative variability for each of the CCB chemical molecules. Variations in elderly-nonelderly differences, other than for bepridil (brand name Vascor) and nimodipine (Nimotop), are modest.
In summary, therefore, over the entire 1990-96 time period, retail-acquisition price inºation for antidepressants destined for use by the elderly has been less than that for the young, reºecting the elderly's greater use of generic antidepressants. Price inºation has been consid-erably greater since 1992 for antibiotics used by the elderly, but the differential is much smaller over the entire 1990-96 time period. Moreover, for antibiotics, the greater elderly price inºation since 1992 appears to reºect the more rapid growth in the elderly's use of the newest, branded drugs, for which bacterial resistance is less. For calcium channel blockers, however, the elderly-nonelderly inºation differentials are negligible.
Two other general results are worth noting. First, growth over time in the sell-in prices for all three therapeutic classes based on the IMS data employed here is less than the inºation as measured by the BLS's producer price index, even when employing the Laspeyres procedure; the 1990-96 differences here are 1.29% per year for ABs, 1.61% for ADs, and 0.83% for CCBs. 34 This differential could reºect different pricing for leading (best-selling) presentations of drugs (the IMS data) than for the basket examined by the BLS, but it could also reºect a known BLS bias in oversampling older branded drugs. (For further discussion, see 34. These differences are computed as growth in the BLS's PPI by therapeutic class (systemic anti-infectives for ABs, psychotherapeutics for ADs, and cardiovasculars for CCBs), reported in table 2.6, minus growth in the Laspeyres index-All entries of table 2.8.
Is Price Inºation Different for the Elderly? 65 Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches 1996; Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett 1993; IMS America 1996; and Kanoza 1996.) Secondly, as shown in table 2.8, in each case the ªxed-weight Laspeyres price index yields a larger measure of price inºation than does the corresponding Divisia index. Over all consumers, for example, the difference is 0.92% per year for ABs, 0.65% for ADs, and 2.34% for CCBs. If one sums these two differentials, the differences in average annual growth rates between the BLS's PPI and the Divisia for retail acquisition prices is 2.21% for ABs, 2.26% for ADs and 3.17% for CCBs. These results are therefore quite consistent with other ªndings reported by the CPI commission and emphasize the importance of the recommendations the commission made, particularly those involving use of changing versus ªxed weights.
V. Retail Sell-Out Prices: Elderly Versus Nonelderly
We now examine price growth in the ªnal point of the distribution chain, that from retail pharmacies to patients and payors. Our research here must be viewed as preliminary in at least two respects. First, we have been unable to obtain reliable method-of-payment data that sepa- rates cash, Medicaid, and third-party insurance payment for the elderly and the nonelderly since 1991. Data graciously made available to us involving a third-party insurer implied an implausibly huge decline in the elderly's use of cash as a method of payment. Our inability to obtain reliable national data is unfortunate, for casual empiricism suggests to us that the elderly's use of third-party payment arrangements to pay for drugs has increased more rapidly in the last few years than that of the general population, particularly because the retired have moved into "Medigap" managed-care arrangements that offer prescription drug beneªts. If in fact in recent years seniors have moved to third-party drug payment more rapidly than the young (consistent with the OOPs data in table 2.3) and therefore increasingly are less affected by higher cash prices, then seniors are disproportionately availing themselves of lower managed-care prices, resulting in lower drug price inºation (but perhaps still higher average price levels) than that experienced by the nonelderly. Research on this issue must be postponed until appropriate data become available.
Second, the IMS sell-out methods-of-payment data are based on the best-selling presentation of a particular branded or generic drug. Problems emerge in measuring price and quantity changes consistently over time when these leading presentations change for brands, and even more so for speciªc generic manufacturers, over the time period under consideration. These problems are particularly evident in our data involving the antibiotics and calcium channel blockers, as are related problems involving products embodying combinations of chemical molecules. In the future we will be working with IMS to obtain data on additional presentations for branded and generic chemical molecules as well as information involving the combination products.
For antidepressants, fortuitously, this second problem involving leading presentations turns out essentially not to be an issue. Thus we report here our preliminary ªndings on sell-out prices by retail pharmacies for only the antidepressant class of prescription drugs. Moreover, because reliable method-of-payment data distinguishing among cash, Medicaid, and third party are not yet available for the elderly and the nonelderly, here we simply employ a weighted average of prices among the three payment methods, assuming the weights in table 2.1 to be the same for the elderly and nonelderly.
IMS method-of-payment data are available only since 1991, whereas the sell-in data analyzed in the previous section go back to 1990. We therefore begin by renormalizing the AD sell-in data from table 2.8 so that the Divisia price index for the AD drugs is 1.000 in 1991. The upper left panel of table 2.9 presents the results of that renormalization. As the table shows, from 1991 to 1996, sell-in prices for AD drugs destined for use by the elderly increased 12%, whereas sell-in prices for AD drugs destined for use by the young increased 19%.
In the introduction to this chapter, we noted the dramatic change over time in retail methods of payment, away from cash and toward third-party payor. For retail pharmacies, the growth in third-party payment implies dealing with a more organized and powerful buyer/payor than is the typical cash customer. We therefore expect that over this time period, sell-out prices (the sum of copayments and third-party reimbursements received by the retail pharmacies) have increased less rapidly than have sell-in prices. One very simple way of highlighting this difference is to compute a "gross margin index," deªned as the sell-out price index divided by the sell-in price index, the former incorporating data from table 2.1 on changing methods of payment over time, assumed to be the same for ADs as for all drugs.
In the top right panel of table 2.9, we present the Divisia price index for retail sell-out, normalized to unity in 1991, and in the bottom panel we list the gross margin index, constructed as outlined in the previous paragraph. Two results are particularly interesting.
First, as expected, the increased role of third-party payors since 1991 has pressured pricing downward in the retail pharmacy sector; although AD prices on a sell-in basis increased 18% over all customers from 1991 to 1996, corresponding sell-out prices increased only 14%. Thus, gross margins for retail pharmacies selling AD products fell 3.5% from 1991 to 1996.
Second, this declining gross margin primarily involved sales of ADs to the young, for whom sell-in retail acquisition prices increased 18.8% from 1991 to 1996 while sell-out prices increased 14.2%, implying a decline of 3.8% in gross margins. For the elderly, however, the gross margin hardly declined at all; indeed, it increased very slightly, 0.4%.
One reason for this disparity is that, as noted earlier and shown visually in ªgure 2.5, the elderly are disproportionately large consumers of generic AD drugs. A number of studies have documented that the retail gross margin on generic drugs is larger, not only in percent-age terms, but often also in absolute amounts, than that on branded products (see, for example, the Federal Trade Commission study by Masson and Steiner (1985) as well as Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz 1991) ; that turns out to be the case here as well. 35 One implication of this larger generic retail margin along with disproportionately large elderly use of generics is that retail pharmacy margins have been under greater downward pressure from nonelderly customers than from the elderly. It must be emphasized, however, that these calculations in table 2.9 assume that the method-of-payment trends displayed in table 2.1 are the same for ADs as over all drugs, and the same for the elderly and the young. If in fact the elderly are moving into Note: Sell-out is in dollars per daily dose of leading presentation, weighted average over channels, with the same channel weights for old and young.
35. For one well-known branded selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, for example, the sell-in price in 1996 was $1.71, but the sell-out price averaged over method-of-payment channel was $2.06, implying a $0.35 absolute margin and a 20.5% percentage gross margin [(sell-out/sell-in) −1]. By comparison, for one well-known older generation tricyclic antidepressant, the sell-in price was $0.12, and the sell-out price was $0.54, implying a $0.42 absolute margin and a 350% percentage gross margin. Note that one would expect the percentage margin to be larger for generics, because a common dispensing fee is added to a lower generic acquisition price.
third-party payment arrangements for drugs more rapidly than the young, these gross margin differentials between young and old tend to be overstated.
VI. Summary and Issues for Further Research
Our purpose in this chapter has been to examine whether prescription drug price inºation in the 1990s has differed between the elderly and the nonelderly when prices are viewed at three alternative points in the distribution chain. Our ªrst ªnding is that in the aggregate, over all therapeutic classes of prescription drugs, we ªnd essentially no age-related price inºation differential at the initial point in the distribution chain involving manufacturers' sales to wholesalers, retailers, and hospitals.
At an intermediate point in the distribution chain involving acquisition prices of retail pharmacies for purchases from manufacturers and wholesalers, we examined sell-in prices for three therapeutic classes of pharmaceuticals, antidepressants, antibiotics and calcium channel blockers over 1990-96. Here we observed some elderly-young price inºation differentials. Speciªcally, we found that from 1990 to 1996, the Divisia price index for ADs destined for use by the elderly grew at an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 3.10%, whereas that for ADs destined for use by the young grew at a higher AAGR of 4.19%. The source of the elderly's lower inºation rate was their disproportionately greater use of older and generic drugs, whose prices are typically falling, whereas those of newer and branded ADs are generally increasing.
For ABs, we observed a slightly different set of trends. Over the entire 1990-96 time period, the Divisia price index for ABs destined for use by the elderly grew at an AAGR of 1.17%, again somewhat less than the 1.74% for those destined for use by the young. Since 1992, however, the elderly price index for ABs has grown at an AAGR of 1.88%, considerably more than the 0.59% for the nonelderly. This difference appears to arise from a more rapid growth among the elderly in the use of the newer, branded drugs than among the young, particularly since 1992. One interpretation of this apparent price inºa-tion differential is that the more fragile elderly are disproportionately using the newer antibiotics that have not yet developed bacterial resistance, when being treated for severe or life-threatening infections such as pneumonia.
Finally, for the calcium channel blockers, the elderly-young sell-in price inºation differential was found to be negligible, with AAGRs being 1.60% for the young and 1.77% for the elderly.
The ªnal point we examined in the distribution chain involves sales of retail pharmacies to consumers and payors. Because of data limitations, we were able to compute sell-out price indexes only for the antidepressant class of prescription drugs. The dramatically increasing share of prescriptions paid for by third-party insurance since 1991 has resulted in retail pharmacy sell-out prices for ADs increasing less rapidly than sell-in prices. The retail pharmacy gross margin index over all customers appears to have fallen about 3.5% between 1991 and 1996, with young patients enjoying most of the beneªts of this increased power of managed care over time at the expense of the retail pharmacy sector. For the elderly, the retail gross margin on ADs has not fallen-indeed it has risen very slightly, reºecting in part the fact that the elderly are disproportionately large users of generic ADs, along with the previously documented ªnding that retail margins on generics tend to be larger than those on branded products. Our sell-out and gross margin calculations assume that trends in methods of payment among cash, Medicaid, and third-party payors are the same for the elderly and the young. To the extent that recently the elderly are enrolling in third-party arrangements with drug beneªts at a more rapid rate than the young, this gross margin differential tends to be overstated, as does growth in sell-out prices for the elderly.
One useful extension of our empirical analysis would involve the introduction of mail-order data into our analysis. Although mail-order sales currently account for only about 9% of all prescription drug sales dollars, mail order is a rapidly growing segment, and apparently one in which the elderly are disproportionately represented.
36 Excluding mail-order prescription drug sales from our analysis most likely results in our overstating overall price growth for the elderly.
In this chapter we have made no attempt to adjust estimated price inºation differentials for variations in the quality of the products used by the elderly versus the young, nor have we linked prices of generics at entry with previous prices of their patented antecedents. It is possible, of course, that our ªndings on greater elderly AB price inºation relative to the young and smaller elderly AD price inºation when 36. Data made available to us involving one mail-order ªrm showed that more than half the prescriptions it dispensed were mailed to patients 65 years and older. compared to the young could be entirely reversed were quality adjustments taken into account. Adjusting price changes and price differentials for quality changes is therefore an important issue meriting further research.
One clear ªnding emerging from this research and corroborated in other studies cited by the CPI commission is that the use of a ªxed-weight Laspeyres price index procedure, such as that employed by the BLS, yields price indexes whose growth is misleading and distorted. In particular, for all three classes of drugs studied, and for all groups of customers, price growth as measured by the Laspeyres ªxed-weight procedure (as employed by the BLS) resulted in greater measured inºation than the market share chain-weighted Divisia index. This ªnding is consistent with that of other studies cited in the CPI commission's report and emphasizes the importance of their ªnding concerning the upward bias of the Laspeyres index and their recommendation of moving to a changing-weight index.
Finally, in this chapter we have examined inºation price differentials involving the elderly and the nonelderly, implicitly assuming that the elderly are homogeneous. It is possible, of course, that there are more differences within the elderly than there are between the elderly and the young. Is income or expenditure inequality greater among the elderly than between the young and elderly? Are there more children living in poverty than there are elderly living solely on Social Security? Clearly, formulating appropriate public policy involving the elderly depends in part on the within versus between issue involving the elderly. 37 In a somewhat different context involving other products, Robert Michael (1979) reports greater variation in expenditures within various demographic groups than between them. Examining the variability in health expenditures and in price inºation for health-related items within the elderly demographic group is therefore also a topic worthy of further attention. (See recent unpublished research ªndings by David Cutler and Elizabeth Richardson (1997) and Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson (1997) .
